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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to consider the metaphysics of geometric
and non-geometric objects as they appear in physical theories such as gen-
eral relativity, and the interactions between these considerations and the con-
temporary doctrines of perspectivalism and fragmentalism in the philosophy
of science. I argue for the following: (i) Taking (following Quine) a kind’s
being associated with a projectable predicate as a necessary condition for
its being natural, there is a sense in which geometric objects can be assim-
ilated to natural kinds, but non-geometric objects cannot; this affords a ra-
tional reconstruction of philosophers’ and physicists’ suspicion of the latter
(although this verdict can also be questioned). (ii) Even granting this, non-
geometric objects can nevertheless represent real quantities in a perspectival
sense—this is one way in which the doctrine of perspectival realism can be
endorsed. (iii) More than this: the recognition that non-geometric objects can
represent real quantities in a perspectival sense affords support for fragmen-
talism: the view (at least in part) that frame-dependent effects are physically
real. That being said, there are arguments to be made that perspectivalism
is superior to this fragmentalism. (iv) There is a certain sense in which per-
spectivalism should be congenial to proponents of the ‘dynamical approach’
to spacetime theories—however, the pairing is, in fact, imperfect. (v) En-
dorsing perspectivalism/fragmentalism in this sense does not commit one to
endorsing related—but arguably more opaque—‘structuralist’ views.
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1 Introduction
The two projects I have indicated (an infinite vocabulary for the
natural series of numbers, a useless mental catalogue of all the
images of his memory) are senseless, but they betray a certain
stammering grandeur. They permit us to glimpse or infer the
nature of Funes’ vertiginous world. — Borges, Funes the Mem-
orious
Famously, if one applies Noether’s theorems to general relativity, one
obtains infinitely many conserved quantities—one for each rigid symmetry
of the Lagrangian—in light of the diffeomorphism invariance of that theory
[55, 56]. Given this, many have repudiated the thought that such conserved
quantities have physical significance, and have invoked notions such as Ein-
stein’s equivalence principle (itself a delicate business—see [39] for a re-
cent philosophical survey) in order to bolster this claim (see e.g. [23, 24, 30]
for defences of this view in the recent philosophical literature). In a previ-
ous paper [61], I defended, against this orthodoxy, the view that such con-
served quantities—associated with the infamous gravitational stress-energy
pseudotensors of general relativity, and more generally with ‘non-geometric
objects’—can have physical significance. On this front, I concur with Pitts,
who writes,
Noether’s theorems do not care about the equivalence principle;
they simply give results in any coordinate system. Rather than
criticizing the results of Noether’s theorem in terms of precon-
ceived notions of invariance and then mysteriously invoking a
principle irrelevant to Noether’s theorem to reduce the puzzle-
ment over the lack of an invariant energy complex, it is prefer-
able to learn from the results of Noether’s theorem that there is a
broader notion of invariance suited to the existence of infinitely
many distinct conserved energies. [56, p. 603]
My goal in the present paper is to bolster this view further, against recent
critiques from Dürr [24], via (a) a more detailed consideration of the meta-
physics of geometric and non-geometric objects than has appeared in the
literature up to this point, and (b) an appeal to perspectivalist and fragmen-
talist positions in the philosophy of science. Although a fair amount of cau-
tion is needed, particularly when dealing with the latter of these two theses
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(i.e., fragmentalism), (a) and (b) together open the door to a Borgesian ver-
tiginous world of genuine physical quantities: exactly what I was after.
The prospectus is this. I begin in §2 by reminding the reader of essen-
tial aspects of the notions of natural kinds and projectable predicates. Then,
in §§3-4, I introduce the distinction between geometric objects and non-
geometric objects, and present a view according to which that the former can
be assimilated (at least loosely) to projectable predicates (and, sometimes,
to natural kinds), while the latter can be assimilated only to non-projectable
predicates; I also consider the ways in which this view can be questioned, and
in which even non-geometric objects might be assimilated to natural kinds.
In §5, I argue that one can regard non-geometric objects, such as the gravi-
tational stress-energy pseudotensors of general relativity, as having physical
significance if one embraces either perspectivalism or fragmentalism in one’s
approach to metaphysics—although I argue that endorsement of the latter of
these two positions constitutes a greater commitment than endorsement of
the former. In §6, I consider the extent to which the ‘dynamical approach’
to spacetime theories of Brown and Pooley [9, 10, 11] can be allied to per-
spectivalism. In §7, I argue that one can embrace either perspectivalism or
fragmentalism—both of which are related to (although distinct from) the pro-
gramme of ‘structural realism’ in the philosophy of science—while rejecting
other more opaque aspects of certain structural realist positions and commit-
ments.
2 Natural kinds and projectable predicates
There’s a close connection between the notion of a natural kind and the no-
tion of a projectable predicate. For the latter, I’ll use Blackburn’s definition:
“A property of predicates, measuring the degree to which past instances can
be taken to be guides to future ones” [6]. That is: projectable predicates
are those which constitute legitimate bases for inductive inferences. As is
extremely well-known, an (in)famous example of projectable versus non-
projectable predicates is due to Goodman: ‘green’ is projectable; ‘grue’ is
not (see [29]).1 Only the former are supposed to be properties which, in
some sense, ‘reflect the structure of the world’: electrons, quinine, and so
forth.
Naturally, philosophers have sought to clarify this connection between
projectable predicates and natural kinds; Quine [60] took it to be the case that
a sufficient condition for a predicate to be projectable is that it refer to natural
kind properties. (This is likely not necessary, though: consider, for example,
the disjunctive predicate associated with the property ‘being green or blue’:
this is not a natural kind property, but the predicate is still projectable.) For
1One has to be careful, however, to get the definition of ‘grue’ correct, in order that this indeed
be a non-projectable predicate—see Jackson [34].
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the purposes of this essay, I’ll follow Quine in this regard.2
3 Geometric objects
In a loose and heuristic sense, a predicate’s being projectable means that one
can ‘transform’ its application in one particular situation, to its application
in another particular situation. Usually, such a transformation is a temporal
translation to the future: if the predicate holds at such-and-such a time, then it
holds also at such-and-such later time. But there’s no reason not to generalise
to richer transformations than mere temporal translations; there is thereby, I
contend, at least a loose (but nevertheless illuminating) connection with the
notion (familiar to philosophers of physics) of a ‘geometric object’.
The formal presentation of the concept of a geometric object goes back
(at least) to works by Nijenhuis [52] and Schouten [67] in the mid-20th Cen-
tury, and was later elaborated on by e.g. Trautman [72, 73]. For a differen-
tiable manifold M, consider an arbitrary point p ∈M and two arbitrary local
coordinate systems around p. In order to specify a geometric object on M,
one writes down (i) a set of components (a set of N real numbers) in each
such coordinate system, and (ii) a well-defined rule relating the components
in the one coordinate system to the components in the other [73, pp. 84-85].3
Non-geometric objects lack at least one of the above—Nijenhuis dubs geo-
metric objects denuded of their transformation rules mere ‘objects’ [52], and
by ‘non-geometric objects’ I will mean such entities in what follows. For an
excellent discussion of what constitutes a ‘well-defined transformation rule’,
see [24, §3.3]—but, in brief, the essential feature is this: if one transforms
(the components of) a given object in a coordinate system A to (its compo-
nents in) a coordinate system C, that must yield the same result as transform-
ing (the components of) the object in A to some intermediate coordinate sys-
tem B, and then to C. Examples of geometric objects abound: metric fields,
n-forms, Christoffel symbols, etc. But there are also familiar examples of
non-geometric objects—perhaps the most famous being gravitational stress-
energy pseudotensors tµν , appearing in general relativistic local energy con-









(Spinors are another famous example of non-geometric objects—see [57]
for discussion—but I will not discuss them further in this article.) A par-
ticular pseudotensor (and there are many—e.g., the Einstein pseudotensor,
2For more on natural kinds, see e.g. [5].
3This is not necessarily a tensorial transformation law—for example, those for connection coef-
ficients in general relativity, or for tensor densities, are not tensorial, but as nevertheless still well-
defined.
4
Landau-Lifshitz pseudotensor, etc.—which differ by a choice of ‘superpo-
tential’ [72]) is a mere object in Nijenhuis’ sense: it consists of a set of com-
ponents in each local coordinate system, but no well-defined set of transfor-
mation rules between those components. Conservation laws such as (1) are
often regarded as being problematic, for at least three reasons:4
1. In general relativity, there are infinitely many such conservation laws:
one (from Noether’s first theorem) for each rigid symmetry of the La-
grangian density. (See [56, 58].)
2. Such conservation laws are closely associated to mathematical identi-
ties. (See [8].)
3. As mentioned, gravitational stress-energy pseudotensors are not geo-
metric objects: they do not have associated transformation laws. (See
[23, 24].)
I’ll forego here a detailed discussion of the first and second objections.5 On
the third: the reasoning here is generally not spelled out explicitly, but typi-
cally runs as follows. First, it is noted that pseudotensors are not geometric
objects. (Again, see [24, §3.3] for an excellent and explicit recent discussion
of this point; [21] is also recommended.) Then, it is asserted (generally with-
out argument!) that geometric objects are the sine qua non of reasoning in
contemporary physics. But, in light of the foregoing, we can now go further:
in light of their lack of transformation laws, non-geometric objects are (in
hopefully a not-too-idiosyncratic sense) non-projectable, and so should not
be regarded as picking out natural kinds. The reason is that one cannot trans-
form (‘project’) the components of such an object in one coordinate system
to its components in another.
On Klein’s Erlangerprogramm to geometry, one can identify geometrical
structures by way of specifying a set of transformation rules, and considering
the invariants of those transformations; the objects so identified will coin-
cide with those objects specified in a coordinate-independent manner on the
‘Riemannian’ approach to geometry currently popular amongst the ‘Chicago-
Irvine school’ of philosophy of physics.6,7 Thus, one can associate geometric
4For some recent literature on this topic, see [15, 21, 23, 24, 30, 38, 55, 56, 61]; the issue is,
however, one which goes back 100 years, to the Noether-Hilbert-Einstein-Klein correspondence.
(For the history of the latter, see [65].).
5In brief: I’m not convinced by them. On the first: one should take the mathematics seriously:
infinitely many rigid symmetries of the Lagrangian density means infinitely many gravitational en-
ergies, in general relativity (in this regard, as already indicated above, I agree with [55, 56, 58]). On
the second: it’s not obvious that mathematical identities can’t have physical content (see [8]).
6For Klein’s original work, see [36]; for a recent philosophical discussion, see [74]. For the locus
classicus of the Chicago-Irvine school, see [42].
7This statement isn’t entirely uncontroversial: for example, it is far from clear that we have
available a coordinate-independent conception of tensor densities. That said, I will set this concern
aside in what follows, for perhaps differential geometry will yield such conceptions in the future!
(My thanks to Brian Pitts for raising this point.)
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objects as defined above with objects specified in a coordinate-independent
manner (one might say: each coordinate system offers a different perspective
on this object—see below for more on such perspectives); not so for non-
geometric objects. Pitts himself uses the terminology of natural kinds here,
when he writes, “Thus the components of a geometric object form a natu-
ral kind mathematically: they constitute faces of one and the same entity by
virtue of being interrelated by a coordinate transformation law” [56, p. 610].
Suggestively, Quine also alludes to (but does not expand on) this connection
in his seminal paper on natural kinds, when he writes: “Perhaps the branches
of science could be revealingly classified by looking to the relative similarity
notion that is appropriate to each. Such a plan is reminiscent of Felix Klein’s
so-called Erlangerprogramm in geometry, which involved characterizing the
various branches of geometry by what transformations were immaterial to
each” [60, p. 55].8 This, however, raises two important further questions:
A. Are all geometric objects to be assimilated to natural kinds, or only a
subset? If the latter, how to identify this subset?
B. Are non-geometric objects not to be assimilated to natural kinds? If
not, why not?
On (A), by analogy with more traditional discussions of natural kinds, one
might wish to state that while all geometric objects are projectable (in the
sense in which I have used the term in this section), only a subset are to be
associated with natural kinds—we will see more on how to spell out this po-
sition in the following section. On (B), both negative and positive answers
seem to be available. The negative answer—that non-geometric objects are
not to be assimilated to natural kinds—would likely consist in the follow-
ing: in light of the lack of transformation rules between the components of
such objects in different coordinate systems, there is no unified, coordinate-
independent entity to be associated with such objects; in this sense, non-
geometric objects do not adequately limn reality.9,10 The positive answer—
that non-geometric objects can be assimilated to natural kinds—would con-
8This constitutes part of a broader tradition of identifying the basic elements of one’s ontology
with invariants—see e.g. [22, 53, 75] for further classic discussion. With this in mind, I take the
connection between the notion of projectability in the sense of transformation laws, and the notion
of projectability in the sense of §2, to be this: a projectable object in the ‘transformation laws’ sense
affords an invariant description, which is a candidate natural kind. Then, per Quine, a predicate
associated with this kind should be projectable in the ‘standard inductive’ sense.
9The situation is complicated slightly by the fact that non-geometric objects sometimes have
well-defined transformation rules for restricted classes of transformations. For example, the Einstein
pseudotensor transforms tensorially under affine transformations [73].
10In this regard, my appeal at [61, p. 225] to the Erlangerprogramm as a means of defending the
reality of (the physical quantities represented by) pseudotensors was somewhat misguided (although
cf. [61, fn. 38], in which I registered that I was construing the ‘Kleinian conception’ differently
from how it was intended originally), for while pseudotensors must be characterised in coordinate-
dependent terms, there are no well-defined transformation rules via which one can identify invariants.
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sist in this: non-geometric objects can still limn the elements of reality; it is
simply that these elements cannot be represented in a non-perspectival man-
ner; i.e., without reference to a coordinate system. Pitts seems to prefer the
latter of these two options, when he writes,
A pseudotensor tµν shares with the Einstein tensor Gµν the phys-
ically interesting property of having a single recipe for inferring
its components in a coordinate system from the metric compo-
nents and their partial derivatives in that coordinate system. Thus
the components do form a natural kind in that physical sense.
However, there is no transformation rule that allows one to infer
the components with respect to one coordinate system from the
components in another, so there is no mathematical unity. [56,
pp. 610-611]
Although (excluding Pitts’ work) the terminology of natural kinds has not
been used in the literature on this topic up to this point, it is fair to say that
almost all authors would disagree with Pitts on this front. For example, while
in many respects sympathetic to Pitts’ writing on pseudotensors and my own,
de Haro writes in a recent article that “it is not quite clear that one can simply
drop the requirement of well-defined transformation properties under diffeo-
morphisms and put nothing in its place: a coherent alternative for it seems
required” [21, §6.1] But this, of course, is not an argument against the status
of non-geometric objects as natural kinds. What one would require here in
order to make progress would be an explicit list of the various criteria which
one might take to be relevant to such status of non-geometric objects. Per-
haps transformation rules are a part of the story here, but they need not be
the whole story—one might think, for example, that various other functional
desiderata contribute to an entity’s being classified as a natural kind: that,
indeed, was part of the moral of [61].
4 Real patterns and mere patterns
In order to make further progress in addressing the above questions, it is now
worth bringing into the fold other recent work on natural kinds. Following
Dennett [19], Ladyman et al. cash out in [37, §4.4] their own ‘ontic struc-
tural realist’ ontology in terms of ‘real patterns’—roughly speaking, patterns
in (our description of) the world which are (i) projectable, and (ii) maximally
information compressing.11 In the language of the previous section: being a
geometric object is sufficient for (i); a certain subset of these (e.g., the met-
ric field of general relativity) will satisfy (ii). Ladyman et al. draw a direct
connection between real patterns and natural kinds: “We contend that every-
thing a naturalist could legitimately want from the concept of a natural kind
11Again roughly speaking, (ii) is intended to preclude disjunctive-but-projectable predicates, such
as ‘being green or blue’. See [37, §4.4] for the full details of this account of real patterns.
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can be had simply by reference to real patterns” [37, p. 294]. So, bringing
the terminology of Ladyman et al. into contact with the previous section,
we can say this: projectable predicates can be assimilated to geometric ob-
jects; a subset of these pick out the natural kinds/real patterns; it is the latter
which constitute (for Ladyman et al.) the true ontology of the theory under
consideration.
What exactly is pathological about objects such as pseudotensors, and
non-geometric objects more generally, in the language of Ladyman et al.?
These authors go on to distinguish real patterns from what they call ‘mere
patterns’. Of the latter, they write: “A mere pattern is a locatable address
associated with no projectable or non-redundant object” [37, p. 231, fn. 51].
In more detail, the idea here is the following. Given the structure of the world
(as given by whatever scientific theory is currently under consideration),12
one can lay down further structure—what Ladyman et al. call ‘locators’ [37,
p. 120]—in order to identify salient aspects of that structure; it is via this
process that the typical metaphysical notions of objects, properties, events,
processes, etc., arise. However, for Ladyman et al., what is identified relative
to such a locator cannot exist in anything but an ontologically ‘thin’ sense—
the true structure of the world remains the structure as described directly by
the scientific theory under consideration itself, without the aid of a locator.
Now, a canonical example of a locator is a coordinate system [37, p. 121];
thus, for Ladyman et al., a structure which can be characterised only with
reference to coordinate systems can (it seems) at best be a mere pattern. Re-
call now also that non-geometric objects such as pseudotensors are indeed
defined only relative to coordinate systems: they do not possess associated
transformation rules which relate their components in one coordinate system
to their components in another, so one cannot (via the Kleinian approach to
geometry) identify an invariant object therefrom. Given this, what it seems
that one should say about pseudotensors and other non-geometric objects, in
the language of Ladyman et al., is the following: they are not to be taken
ontologically seriously, for they are not projectable/are not natural kinds/are
mere patterns.
Returning to (A) and (B) in the previous section, we see that Ladyman
et al. would maintain, via their notion of ‘real patterns’ (and, for what it’s
worth, in agreement with my own verdicts), that only a subset of the geo-
metric objects should be identified with natural kinds. On (B), it seems that
they would issue a negative answer. But again, one can ask: why should an
12Note: not ‘our best fundamental theory of physics’, given Ladyman et al.’s ‘rainforest realism’,
according to which ontology is ‘scale-relative’—see [37, ch. 4].
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invariant representation be the sine qua non of naturalness?13,14 And even
granting that non-geometric objects can at best be associated with ‘mere pat-
terns’, does it necessarily follow that there is no sense in which such objects
are ‘physical’?15 It is to this latter question which I now turn.
5 Perspectivalism and fragmentalism
What I assess in this section is whether the verdict that non-geometric objects
cannot have physical content is too fast, even granting that they are not to be
associated with natural kinds, and are (in the parlance of Ladyman et al.)
‘mere patterns’. One immediate thing to say on this is the following: there is
a crucial difference between spacetime coordinate systems, and other loca-
tors which one may lay down (for example, particular gauge choices in elec-
tromagnetism). Namely: the former are associated with the vantage points of
observers—thus, what is described using such locators has the capacity to be
amenable to direct empirical access.16,17 Given this, an alternative take on
such non-geometric objects is that they are real, but perspectival. Embracing,
pace the orthodoxy and Ladyman et al. (at least in this particular regard), the
reality of (the objects represented by) peseudotensors (and also of the space-
time coordinate representations of geometric objects) is one particular sense
in which I would count myself a ‘perspectival realist’.18
13Dürr makes essentially the same point—that one needs clear and well-articulated criteria for
naturalness—at [24, p. 10], albeit from the standpoint of antirealism about gravitational-stress energy
in general relativity. See also earlier in Dürr’s paper: “Only if one is already attracted to realism
about gravitational energy (undergirded by egalitarianism about GR), will one find Read’s position
attractive, too” [24, p. 2].
14James Ladyman has suggested to me that one might be able to invoke the non-redundancy of
real patterns, and redundancy of mere patterns (see again [37, p. 231, fn. 51]), in order to argue that
some non-geometric objects can be associated with real patterns after all (i.e., when they are non-
redundant). While this would overcome the above-described tension with Pitts’ verdicts, I struggle
to square it with the scepticism of Ladyman et al. towards objects defined relative to locators; thus,
more needs to be said if one wishes to defend the status of non-geometric objects as representing real
patterns within their framework. (My thanks to James Ladyman for discussion here.)
15Clearly, the notion of ‘physical’ requires elaboration; I turn to this in the following section.
16Here, I am following quite standard practice in taking it that idealised observers can be opera-
tionalised via coordinate frames (more on the operational significance of coordinate frames below).
This is not to deny that one might wish to do more to ‘schematise the observer’ in any given physical
theory—see [16] for recent discussion—but I will set these matters aside in the remainder of this
essay.
17There are complications here regarding the limits of indexical reference—see [14, 18, 46] for
discussion—but I will also set these matters aside for the purposes of this essay.
18See e.g. [44] for an introduction to perspectival realism more generally. As Massimi puts it,
the starting point for perspectival realism is the thesis that “one can accept and fully endorse that
scientific inquiry is indeed pluralistic and that there is no unique, objective, and privileged epis-
temic vantage point without necessarily having to conclude that perspectives shape scientific facts or
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Recently, some issues related to these have been discussed in the philo-
sophical literature on special relativity, under the guise of ‘fragmentalism’: a
term coined in this context by Fine [28].19 The issue which the fragmentialist
about special relativity seeks to address is once again whether, in addition to
four-dimensional, coordinate-independent structures, one should also regard
frame-dependent phenomena (e.g., frame-relative facts about simultaneity)
as being real. Here is how Lipman puts the view:
The importance is that of marking a metaphysical realism about
those variant matters. The relevant question is whether real-
ism or antirealism is true about the frame-relative facts, that is,
whether consideration of the special theory of relativity removes
all frame-relative facts from one’s metaphysical conception of
reality: the Minkowskian answers yes, the fragmentalist answers
no. [41, p. 31]
It should be of no surprise to find that I would count myself a realist about
frame-relative facts. However, for all its many merits, in my view Lipman’s
discussion of these matters effaces an important difference which one might
draw between perspectivalism on the one hand, and fragmentalism on the
other, which deserves to be made explicit.
As I understand it, perspectivalism involves a commitment to the reality
of frame-relative facts. Suppose that some object a has some property P in
some coordinate frame F , but does not have property P in some other frame
G (consider e.g. the property of ‘moving with uniform velocity’). Then, us-
ing Fine’s ‘reality operator’ R (see [28, §2]), one might, as a perspectivalist,
assent to both RPF a and R¬PGa, where subscripts on predicates indicate
the coordinate frame (‘perspective’) from which the property ascription is
made. Note that, given the perspective-relativisation of property ascription
here, the totality of realist commitments for the perspectivalist is not contra-
dictory. Here the view differs from fragmentalism in Fine’s sense, according
to which “The overall collection of facts,‘über-reality’, includes pairs of mu-
tually incompatible facts” [41, p. 23]. Given this, one way to understand
the difference between perspectivalism and fragmentalism is that the latter
should simply drop the perspective-relativisation of properties in the fore-
going, assenting, rather, to both RPa and R¬Pa—i.e., to a genuinely self-
contradictory set of realist commitments.
relativize truth” [44, p. 170].
19Fine’s focus is principally on fragmentalism about tense and the A-series—according to this
view, there are infinitely many A-series, all of which are prima facie incompatible, but which are
reconcilable via fragmentalism. This position is closely related to Maudlin on tense, according to
which there are infinitely many A-series [45, ch. 4, p. 126, fn. 11], but all of these can be reduced
to a fundamentally B-theoretic ontology (clearly, however, the fragmentalist would not endorse this
latter reduction). At [64, fn. 70], it is argued that Maudlin’s position on tense is akin to that of Pitts
on gravitational energy—although there is a difference, for as we have already seen, in the case of
gravitational energy no such reduction is possible.
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If fragmentalism really is best understood in this way, then I’m not sure
I can assent to it: it’s too Hegelian for me.20 So, while I leave open the
possibility of fragmentalism in the above sense, and maintain that it does (as
with perspectivalism) afford a means of being a realist about (say) pseudoten-
sorial quantities, I commit myself only to perspectivalism in what follows.21
Such a perspectivalist position seems, in my view, to address Dürr’s concerns
regarding how one can be a realist about gravitational energy while abandon-
ing the paradigm that only geometric objects have physical content (see [24,
p. 10]); it also, I hope, goes some way to addressing the call for clarity issued
by de Haro at [21, §6.1].22
Consideration of non-geometric objects such as gravitational stress-energy
pseudotensors might, in fact, afford a better context for a defence of per-
spectivalism/fragmentalism than the case of special relativity, considered in
[28, 41]. This is due to the fact that, in the special relativistic context, the
existence of transformation rules between the components of the geometric
objects under consideration (e.g., the Minkowski metric field) in each coor-
dinate system means that it is possible to construct a coordinate-independent
representation of such objects. When it comes to pseudotensors, however, it
is not possible to construct such a representation. Thus, in this latter case, as
already discussed above, there is no non-perspectivalist/fragmentalist picture
of the physics which is available.23
Hofweber and Lange [31] criticise Finean fragmentalism, on the grounds
that it is incompatible with the fact that an invariant structure (Minkowksi
spacetime) is usually taken to explain the Lorentz transformations. Thus, as
Lipman puts it, the concern is that
The fragmentalist interpretation under discussion, which takes
the variant properties to be real and the grounds for the space-
20See [50, §7.7] for a fascinating discussion of the role of contradiction in Hegel’s metaphysics.
As Moore writes, “He [Hegel] accepts the contradiction. The truly infinite, for Hegel, embraces a
co-existence of opposed aspects, and the relevant arguments concerning the extent of the physical
universe simply highlight some of these. Like all such opposed aspects, they are to be aufgehoben in
the infinite’s progress towards self-knowledge.” Later in the section, Moore continues, “Contradic-
tion is the motor force of change. By its very nature it propels reality to a higher stage of development
in which it is aufgehoben.” One might wonder what the higher stage of development is in our present
case—perhaps (a non-contradictory!) perspectivalist approach, or a (non-contradictory!) ‘orthodox’
spacetime approach. Insofar as I regard both of these latter approaches as being superior to fragmen-
talism, I am not sure that I disagree with a Hegelian reading of this dialectic (in both the ordinary
and Hegelian sense!) after all.
21For complimentary arguments against fragmentalism and in favour of perspectivalism, see [68].
22In [40, n. 31], Le Bihan and I take regarding all gravitational stress-energy pseudotensors to be
physically meaningful as a case of what we call ‘pluralism’, and cite Pitts accordingly. It should be
clear that this ‘pluralism’ is closely related to the perspectivalism/fragmentalism discussed here.
23Returning to footnote 20: although in this case there remains the possibility for the contradiction
to be aufgehoben in perspectivalism, the alternative possibility of an ‘orthodox’ spacetime approach
is no longer available.
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time interval, cannot offer the standard explanation. The stan-
dard interpretation underwrites the standardly assumed explana-
tory priority of the spacetime interval, whereas the fragmentalist
conflicts with it. [41, p. 33]
Following Lipman [41, §4], it doesn’t seem to me that these objections to
fragmentalism are successful. On the one hand, why assume that the ‘stan-
dard interpretation’ is correct—especially when there exist alternative ap-
proaches, e.g. the ‘dynamical approach’ of Brown and Pooley [9, 10, 11],
according to which it is dynamical symmetries which ground invariant space-
time structure, rather than vice versa (more on the connections between per-
spectivalism/fragmentalism and the dynamical approach in the following sec-
tion). Such methodologies are live, and would seem to evade Hofweber and
Lange’s critique. In addition, it is worth noting that the following combina-
tion of views seems to reconcile the ‘standard interpretation’ with fragmen-
talism: (i) the form of the coordinate transformations relating inertial frames
of reference is grounded in/explained by invariant spacetime structure; (ii)
nevertheless, frame-dependent phenomena should be regarded as being real
(cf. [41, p. 32]).
6 The dynamical approach and perspectivalism
It is worth pausing to reflect further on the interrelations between perspec-
tivalism (in the sense considered in this paper up to this point) and the dy-
namical approach to spacetime theories, as defended in [9, 10, 11]. Based
on the above discussion, one might think that these approaches are natural
bedfellows, insofar as the dynamical approach (at least as presented in the
context of special relativity—see [12] for discussion of how the dynamical
approach plays out differently in special versus general relativity) begins with
coordinate-dependent descriptions of the relevant physics, and seeks to con-
struct the associated spacetime structure therefrom.24 Although such a line
of thought is roughly correct, the situation here is, in fact, delicate, for several
reasons.
One point stressed repeatedly by Brown in his presentation of the dy-
namical approach is owed to Bell [4]: that it is possible to teach special
relativity, and derive paradigmatic special relativistic effects such as length
contraction and time dilation, from within a single frame of reference (see
in particular [9, 10]). Famously, Bell considers a classical model of an elec-
tron; after physically implementing an active boost, the electron is found to
be Lorentz contracted (this is what is called in [47] a ‘Lorentz push’). It
24Recall Brown: “The appropriate structure is Minkowski geometry precisely because the laws of
physics of the non-gravitational interactions are Lorentz covariant” [9, p. 133]. (See also [11, p. 10].)
In §7, I mention programmes in metaphysics—namely, liberalised Humean approaches—which seem
to afford the means to underwrite such claims.
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would be perfectly acceptable for a proponent of the dynamical approach to
take the Poincaré invariant laws of special relativity to codify such physical
effects observed within a single frame, and in turn to take spatiotemporal
structure to be a codification of the symmetries of those laws. On this under-
standing, there is never any need for a proponent of the dynamical view to
appeal to different perspectives. (Cf. Miller’s distinction between ‘perspec-
tival’ and ‘dynamical’ interpretations of special relativistic effects, and the
approving citation thereof to be found in [12].)
That being said, there is nothing problematic (modulo caveats to be dis-
cussed below) about signing up to the dynamical approach alongside per-
spectivalism. Consider again Bell’s atom. From the point of view of the
frame co-moving with the atom in its initial state, that atom undergoes length
contraction; whereas, from the point of view of the frame co-moving with the
atom in its final state, the atom decelerates, and thereby expands in length.
A perspectivalist can say that the accounts offered from both of these per-
spectives are equally true; in addition, a fragmentalist will want to regard
the accounts associated with both of these frames as being associated with
(mutually inconsistent) facts. Focussing on perspectivalism in what follows
given the above-discussed concerns regarding fragmentalism: there is noth-
ing wrong with admitting these relativised facts into one’s ontology, even as
a proponent of the dynamical approach. Indeed, arguably proponents of the
view must admit such facts, unless they wish to state that there is some pre-
ferred frame—something which Brown repudiates vehemently: “I feel, from
dire experience, I must emphasize from the outset that this approach does
not involve postulating the existence of a hidden preferred inertial frame!”
[9, p. vii]
There are, however, limits to what counts as an admissible perspective,
on the dynamical approach. Recall that, throughout [9], Brown subscribes to
Einstein’s operational understanding of coordinates—presented in the latter’s
first annus mirabilis paper on special relativity [26]—according to which one
requires spatial coordinates to ‘match’ the length of rigid measuring rods that
are at rest in the system in question, and time coordinates to ‘match’ the tick-
ings of clocks at rest in that system. Given this operational understanding
of coordinates, it is clear that proponents of the dynamical approach who
wish to subscribe to perspectivalism should not quantify unrestrictedly over
frames of reference, but rather only over those frames of reference which can
be suitably operationalised. Combining unrestricted perspectivalism with an
operational understanding of coordinates would, arguably, bring with it con-
sequences unacceptable to proponents of a dynamical approach—for con-
sider some reference frame which cannot be operationalised with respect to
material, physical bodies; a fallback attempt to do so might then appeal to
immaterial bodies—e.g., spacetime—not congenial to the empiricist spirit of
the dynamical view.
In sum, then: the dynamical approach is consistent with perspectivalism
and fragmentalism (granting that the latter is consistent at all!); however,
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it does not sit will with an unrestricted quantification over frames of refer-
ence. This, potentially, has upshots also for debates over gravitational en-
ergy: while fans of the concept (e.g. [61]) could be read as perspectivalists
about this quantity, insofar as they also wish to subscribe to an operational
understanding of coordinates, and more generally to the dynamical approach,
they should not necessarily affirm the reality of the physical quantities cor-
responding to the components of pseudotensors in all coordinate systems,
but, rather, only the reality of the physical quantities corresponding to the
components of pseudotensors in those coordinate systems which can be ap-
propriately operationalised.25
7 Other forms of structuralism
In the sense articulated above, then, I would be happy to count myself a
perspectivalist (although not a fragmentalist) about spacetime theories. In the
literature, both perspectivalism and fragmentalism are often bound up with
discussions of ‘structural realism’—and while I find much of the structuralist
opera [27, 37] to be congenial and compelling, I want to indicate in this
section two views in the vicinity of structuralism which I do not endorse.
The first is the aspect of the above-discussed dynamical approach to
spacetime theories, which claims that it is incoherent for spacetime symme-
tries to come apart from dynamical symmetries,26 for the two are analytically
related (see e.g. [1, 51] for claims of this kind). I reject this claim; rather,
I side with the orthodoxy in regarding (say) the different spacetime set-
tings for Newtonian mechanics as coherent metaphysical possibilities. While
the dynamical approach’s seeking to reduce spacetime structure to dynami-
cal symmetries is compelling and intriguing, it (a) does not undercut this
metaphysical plurality, and (b) itself needs to be undergirded by a precisely-
articulated metaphysical strategy (see e.g. the liberalised Humean approach
of [32, 33, 59, 69, 70, 71]).
Why do I reject this aspect of the dynamical view? In part, my reasons
have to do with my endorsement of what Møller-Nielsen calls the ‘moti-
vational’ approach to symmetries [43, 49, 62, 63], according to which it is
insufficient to simply declare that one’s ontological commitments are picked
out by (the invariant structures associated with) the symmetries of one’s phys-
ical theories (as on the opposing ‘interpretational’ approach to symmetries);
rather, one needs to do the metaphysical hard graft of providing a positive
articulation of what such structure is supposed to be, in advance of making
such declarations of physical equivalence. The issue with the above version
of the dynamical approach is that it declares that spacetime symmetries just
25I am very grateful to Mahdi Khalili for discussions on the contents of this section.
26The distinction between spacetime and dynamical symmetries is standard; for the definition of
each, see [25, ch. 3]. Famously, Earman maintains that the matching of such symmetries is not given
a priori, but is nevertheless an ‘adequacy condition’ on the formulation of a given theory.
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are dynamical symmetries, but it does not necessarily accompany this with a
positive metaphysical picture of what the structure of spacetime actually is.
Furthermore, it may be that the positive metaphysical picture of the structure
of spacetime which one does construct is such that spacetime symmetries
do not align with dynamical symmetries. Consider, for example, the devel-
opment of Newtonian spacetimes. As Dasgupta writes, “we can draw the
conclusion of the inference only when we have the alternative theory in hand
and have shown that all else is equal. This explains why it was rational for
Newton to believe in absolute velocity even though he knew that it was vari-
ant in [Newtonian gravity] and undetectable. The reason this was rational for
him was that he had no good alternative theory to hand” [17, p. 854]. Here,
it strikes me as wrong to say that Newton was simply being incoherent in his
postulation of the persisting points of absolute space—as the above version
of the dynamical approach would have it.27,28
The second version of structuralism which I hesitate to accept is what
Dewar calls in [20] ‘external sophistication’ about symmetries, according to
which, by treating symmetry-related solutions of a given physical theory ‘as
if’ they are isomorphic, one can give a positive articulation of that theory’s
(non-perspectival) metaphysical commitments.29 The reason, again, is that
one has to give a positive articulation of what the non-perspectival reality is
supposed to be, before such declarations of equivalence are issued; more-
over, the possibility that one’s ontological commitments might be given by
pseudotensors and other non-geometric objects casts doubt on whether that
invariant description is invariably there to be had (see [43, 49, 62, 63]).30
This being said—and contrary to [43, 49, 62, 63]—I am no longer con-
vinced that mathematical reformulation is necessary, even for models which
are not isomorphic, in order to secure what the motivationalist calls a ‘meta-
physically perspicuous characterisation’ of the common ontology of these
models. (In this paragraph, for the sake of simplicitly, I set aside the above
concern that one’s best explication of the common ontology of symmetry-
related models might invoke the invocation of non-geometric objects.) To
illustrate this, consider kinematic shifts in Newtonian gravitation theory.31
27For recall that Newtonian spacetime has fewer symmetries than the Galilean symmetries of the
laws of Newtonian gravity—see [25, ch. 2].
28Of course, one might question whether Dasgupta’s Newton exegesis is accurate: see [66] for a
recent re-reading of the Principia. This latter work does, however, not undercut the philosophical
point which is being made here.
29In fact, external sophistication was developed in an attempt to bolster the interpretational ap-
proach to symmetries—see [43]. Note that external sophistication is to be distinguished as a means
of articulating the ontology of symmetry-related models of a physical theory from what Dewar calls
‘internal sophistication’; I have no qualms with the latter approach. For discussion of the difference,
see [35, 43].
30One option for Dewar here might be to appeal to the definability of objects, rather than their
invariance. My thanks to Fiona Doherty for this suggestion, which I hope to pursue in a future piece.
31See e.g. [46] for a clear introduction to such shifts and their historical origins in the correspon-
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Before moving to the setting of Galilean spacetime,32 one can identify the in-
variants of shifted models of one’s original theory: these will include relative
particle positions and velocities. There is an only slightly stronger version
of external sophistication which should, in principle, be acceptable to mo-
tivationalists: according to this view, once one has identified the invariants
associated with symmetry-related models (this step is required; in this sense,
the position is stronger than external sophistication as presented in [20] and
as discussed in [43]), it is possible that one can construct directly a metaphys-
ically perspicuous characterisation of the common ontology of these symme-
try related models, without recourse to a mathematical reformulation of the
original models. The mathematical reformulation may constitute a crutch for
securing a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the common on-
tology of these symmetry-related models, but on this view it is not necessary
for reaching that end. In the current example, the question would be: can
one construct a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the common
ontology of shifted Newtonian models directly from the above-mentioned
invariant quantities?33
Thus, while I count myself a perspectivalist in the sense that I regard
frame-dependent effects as being physical and real (at least for those frames
which can be appropriately operationalised), and moreover while I find much
contemporary work on structuralism to be compelling and insightful, I am
hesitant to sign up straightforwardly to structuralism in either of the two
senses considered in this section: before one can declare models of a given
physical theory to be associated with the same (non-perspectival) reality, one
has to present a positive picture of what said reality is supposed to be;34 the
relevant aspects of the dynamical approach, and external sophistication as
presented in [20], do not suffice (at least without modification of the kind
discussed above) to this end.
8 Conclusions
In this article, I’ve related the notions of natural kinds/projectable predi-
cates/real patterns to the notion of a geometric object, and have used this to
account for the widespread suspicion towards non-geometric objects. That
notwithstanding, I’ve argued that non-geometric objects can have physical
content in a perspectivalist/fragmentalist sense, and might arguably also be
associated with natural kinds, at least in some cases. Although I endorse
only perspectivalism, and not fragmentalism, I’ve set both of these views
dence between Leibniz and Clarke [2].
32For background on different spacetime settings for Newtonian mechanics, see [25, ch. 2].
33I am grateful to Caspar Jacobs for discussion on this paragraph.
34That is, one has to address what French calls ‘Chakravartty’s challenge’ [27, pp. 48-49]. See [13,
p. 26] for the original work, which I take to be in the same spirit as Møller-Nielsen’s motivationalism.
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apart from aspects of prima facie related structuralist positions which I re-
ject. I have also considered how perspectivalism and fragmentalism interact
with the dynamical approach to spacetime theories.
The broader lesson of this piece is the following. One finds in contem-
porary physics multifarious ‘fantastic beasts’ (cf. [23])—the pseudotensors
arising via application of Noether’s theorems to general relativity are just one
example. It is incumbent upon philosophers to engage with the metaphysics
of all such objects, rather than merely with more terrestrial and prosaic ob-
jects such as tensors. Moreover, the study of such objects has the potential
to bolster positions such as perspectivalism and fragmentalism in the philos-
ophy of science.
Acknowledgements
I am extremely thankful to Brian Pitts for detailed and very helpful com-
ments on a previous draft of this paper. In addition, I am grateful to Adam
Caulton, Neil Dewar, Fiona Doherty, Patrick Dürr, Caspar Jacobs, Mahdi
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